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Abstract 
 
 
Trust and trustworthiness are important components of social capital and much attention has been devoted 
to the problems of their correct evaluation. Attitudinal survey questions as reported in  the EVS – European 
Value Survey -  are often regarded as inefficient indicators of trust, since they lack of  behavioural 
underpinnings (Putnam, 1995) which one might desire when measuring trust. 
In this paper, we consider alternative measures of trust and trustworthiness, based on behavioural 
assumptions. We construct two relative behavioural measures of trust (RBM1 and RBM2), both based on the 
ex post measurement of trust, once individuals are informed on the level of trustworthiness of the social group 
to which they have been allocated during the experiment. Our main finding is that the relative behavioural 
measures show that trust strongly varies once the individual is informed on the on the level of trustworthiness 
of the social group to which he\she has been allocated during the experiment. This difference is higher the 
higher is the family level  of income and the parental education status.  As for previous findings (Glaeser et 
al., 2000, Lazzarini, 2005) which have found no correlation between attitudinal and behavioural measures of 
trust, we find that relative behavioural measures are not correlated to attitudinal measures but they are 
strongly correlated to groups’ trustworthiness. We also find that similar social preferences profiles (between 
Senders and Recipients)  tend to enhance the individual level of trust, in the RBM2 context. This result seems 
to confirm the importance of the homogeneity of the social environment when studying the effects of policy 
interventions (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Trust and trustworthiness are important components of social capital and much 
attention has been devoted to the problems of their correct evaluation. Attitudinal survey 
questions as reported in  the EVS – European Value Survey -  are often regarded as 
inefficient indicators of trust, since they lack of  behavioural underpinnings (Putnam, 
1995), as one may desire when measuring trust.
1
 Furthermore, a number of criticisms to 
their potential sources of biases have been raised. As noticed in Ciriolo (2007), self-
reported attitudinal measures of trust can be affected by three different types of 
behavioural biases. In fact, when answering the question: “Generally speaking would you 
say that most people can be trusted or can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”,  
respondents may underestimate the importance of the issue, considering the abstract 
context as only  a hypotetical setup (hypotethical bias); individuals may also wish to 
represent themselves as more virtuous than they actually are (idealised persona bias); 
finally the lack of incentives may induce false responses (lack of incentive bias).
2
   
Another unsatisfactory aspect of the attitudinal measures is the implicit separation 
between trust and trustworthiness, seen as different components of the individuals’ social 
preference utility functions. In the EVS survey,  the basic measurement of trust is 
provided by the answers to the above reported question: “Generally speaking, etc.”, 
whilst measures of trustworthiness are defined on the basis of the answers provided to 
questions like the ones involving civic cooperation
3
, in which individuals report their 
dislike for free riding behaviour (tax evasion, etc). As for the trust question, the rationale 
                                                 
1
 There has been a long debate on the measurement of non-economic sources of economic development. 
See Coleman (1990); Putnam et al. (1993); Paldam and Svendsen (2000).  Also in Italy there have been a 
number of recent contributions, see for example Degli Antoni (2005). 
2
 See Ciriolo (2007), p. 2. 
3
  See T. Van Schaig 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997. 
 2 
beyond the self reported measures of trustworthiness relies mainly on the unconditional 
ethical individuals’ values .  
There are a number of unsatisfactory aspects related to the separation of these two 
social capital components.  
Firstly, if  the economist’s interest lies in assessing the role played by these factors in 
influencing the level of cooperation in a community and the strength of its political and  
economic institutions, so that economic development is favoured, the relative importance 
of the two factors cannot easily be disantangled. In other words, economic welfare thrives 
when in a community there is a high level of trust or when there is a high level of 
trustworthiness (Degli Antoni, 2005). Furthermore,  recent research by Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2000, 2002) has argued that  race and ethnic heterogeneity are key factors in 
explaining the overall decrease in the self reported level of trust.
4
  According to this point 
of view, one may argue that, when individuals are aware of the social preference attitudes 
(therefore both trust and trustworthiness) of the agents with whom they currently interact 
and, moreover,  when they share with them part of their views and values, then there are 
higher individual incentives to trust. Thus, trusting attitudes depend not only the 
information on the community level of trustworthiness but also on the ethical similarities 
between individuals.  
Secondly, there is a theoretical reason why trust and trustworthiness cannot be 
disantangled.  New game theory models and experimental implementation of bargaining 
games have clearly shown that trust can be viewed as the strategic response to 
trustworthiness. In fact, according to Fehr and Schimdt, 1999, 2006, individuals tend to 
reciprocate and to respond to the social behaviour they observe in real life contexts. More 
than the absolute levels of trust, as in the EVS survey,  what we should therefore observe 
and measure are the conditional levels of trust, where we take into account not only the 
                                                 
4
 The proportion of people providing positive answers to the question: “Generally speaking, etc.” Has 
sharply decreased in the US in the period 1960-1995 (Putnam, 2000).  
 3 
ethical, cultural and psycological foundations  of trusting behaviour but also the strategic 
behavioural decision rule that is inserted in the concept.   
In other words, the arguments reported above seem to point out that, when measuring 
trust, we should ideally separate two definitions of trusting behaviour: an ex ante 
definition of trust, which is dependent only on the individuals’ ethical and social 
characteristics, and  an ex post definition of trust, which reflects, in addition to those 
characteristics,  the behavioural response to the perceived trustworthiness (and 
heterogeneity) of the social environment in which individuals operate.  
Attitudinal biases, lack of behavioural underpinnings, incorrect decision model’ 
specifications of the concepts of trust and trustworthiness have spurred alternative lines 
of empirical research in the study of the primitives of social capital.  
An important field of study relates to economic experiments on bargaining games 
where individuals are financially motivated.  
In a seminal paper by Glaeser et al., 2000,
5
 subjects were asked to answer questions on 
trust and trustworthiness, as reported in the World Value Survey. Subsequently, they 
were asked to participate in a trust game (Berg et al. , 1995) in the roles of  Senders and 
Recipients.
6
 The main scope of the research was to test whether there were significant 
differences between attitudinal self reported measures of trust and behavioural measures 
                                                 
5
 The experiments reported in the paper have been reproduced in Lazzarini et al., 2005. 
6
 The structure of the sequential game is well known: at the begininng of the experiments, subjects are 
divided into two groups S and R (Senders and Recipients). Senders are allocated a number of  experimental 
tokens which will be converted into cash at the end of experiment. They have to decide whether to keep the 
tokens or to send a part (or the entire amount) of the total to a Recipient with whom she/he  is playing.  If 
they decide to send tokens to the Recipient, the number of tokens sent is multyplied by a factor α ≥ 1, so 
that the Recipient’s endowment  is equal to αs, where s is the initial number of tokens sent by the partner. 
The Recipient can take now her/his decision and send back any number of tokens to the Sender. There is a 
unique Nash equilibrium in the game, where no token is sent by S (and – if the game reaches her/his 
decision node – no token is sent back by R); if the observed number of tokens is greater than zero, players 
are assumed to have a utility function in which they take into account the rival’s level of utlity along with 
their own. If S ( R ) send (return) the entire tokens’ endowment, they are defined altruistic players, if they 
prefer an equal share of the total endowment, they are defined fair players.  Bargaining games experiments 
are often used to test cooperative or individualistic behaviour among individuals. A new stream of 
application is represented by field experiments on bargaining games, where cooperation is tested among 
different ethnic groups (see Barr, 2004). In some cases, such implementations have been sponsored by 
international organizations and their results have been used in country studies.  
 4 
of trust, as derived by the results of the experimental games. The main result of the study 
was that there was a very low correlation between attitudinal measures of trust and 
behavioural measures. The authors however found a higher correlation between the latter 
ones and the attitudinal measures of trustworthiness.  
In the present paper, as in Glaeser et al.  (2000), we compare attitudinal and 
behavioural measures of trust in a sample of 184 students from the Universities of 
Salerno and Siena. Again, as in Glaeser et al.  (2000),  students are first asked to fill a 
questionnaire in which the relevant EVS survey questions are reproduced, and then  they 
participate in a trust game experiment.  
In addition to that, however, we construct two relative behavioural measures of trust 
(RBM1 and RBM2), both based on the ex post measurement of trust, once individuals are 
informed on the level of trustworthiness of the social group to which they have been 
allocated during the experiment. 
 In the case of the RBM1 measure, we adopt a social preference elicitation technique 
(see Selten, 1967), known as the strategy method , in order to derive the individual level 
of trustworthiness of the subjects who are then asked to participate as Recipients in the 
trust game, in a specific social group.
7
 
In the case of RBM2, we derive the individual level of trustworthiness of respondents 
directly from the attitudinal questionnaires’ answers. In both cases, Senders in the trust 
game are informed of the level of  Recipients’ trustworthiness, before making their 
decision. 
The aim of our study is twofold.  
First, we apply  the experimental methodology in order to derive behavioural measures 
of trust and trustworthiness in Italy, so to compare them with the existing country-based 
measures. 
                                                 
7
 Details of the strategy method experimental procedure are given in section 2. 
 5 
Second, by estimating absolute and  relative behavioural measures of trust,  we are able 
to assess the relevance of  the ex  ante (individuals’ ethical and social characteristics- or 
absolute trust) and the ex post (individuals’strategic response to observed trustworthiness 
– or conditional trust) factors in determining the incentive to trust. 
There are two  main results to our research. First, in reproducing the Glaser’s 
experiments in Italy, we found a strong similarity between the US and the Italian sample, 
both in the answers to the questionnaires and in the trusting behaviour. As for the 
previous paper, we find a low correlation between the answers to the trusting questions 
and the actual behaviour of Senders in the TG (without information). A higher correlation 
is however found between the latter and the questionnaires’ answers to the 
trustworthiness questions.    
Second, and more importantly, all correlation between qustionnaires answers and 
individuals’ behaviour disappear when the information on the co-players types is 
introduced, indicating that the main determinant of  the incentive to trust are the 
perceived levels of trustworthiness of the individuals’ social environment, rather than the 
ethical and psychological values. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the experimental 
designs and incentives. Section 3 reports the results of our research. Section 4 concludes 
and suggests new possible extensions to our line of research.  
 
 
2. The Experimental Design 
 
The experiments were conducted in Siena and Salerno (May 2007) and 184 students 
participated in the 6 sessions in which the experiment was organised. Session 1-4 were 
 6 
designed to test the relative behavioural measure RBM1, while the experimental design 
of Sessions 5-7 aimed to test the relative measure RBM2.  
All sessions were divided into three different stages. In the first stage, the subjects were 
asked to fill in a questionnaire in which the EVS questions in relation to trust and 
trustworthiness were reproduced.  Table 1 reports the whole set of questions that 
appeared on the students’ computer screens.   
 
 
Table 1: Questionnaire on Trust and Trustworthiness 
Subjects’ characteristics Trust 
 
1s Sex (M/F) 1t Trust in others (y/n) 
2s Age (19/30) 2t Trust in family (1-4) 
3s Father 
education (1-6) 
3t Trust in friends (1-4) 
4s Mather 
education  1-6 
4t Trust new encounters (1-4) 
5s Degree (1-3) 5t Trust immigrants (1-4) 
6s Year (1-3) 6t Ethnical diversity (1-10) 
7s Family income 
(1-4) 
7t (S)Trust others motivations (1-10) 
8s  8t  
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Table 1: continues..... 
Trust and Institutions Trustworthiness 
1ti Trust Government (1-4) 1tw Accept undeserved 
benefits 
2ti Trust Parliament (1-4) 2tw Tax evasion 
3ti Trust Parties (1-4) 3tw Stealing&using car 
4ti Trust Public Sector (1-4) 4tw Lying 
5ti  5tw Deceiving partner 
6ti  6tw Accept bribery 
7ti  7tw Paying for illegal work, 
e.g., immigrants 
8ti  8tw Evading bus fares 
 
The criteria we followed in selecting  these specific questions are related to our 
hypotheses testing. In fact, we concentrated our attention on the set of questions which 
are aimed at assessing the individual’s level of trust and trustworthiness, together with 
some general characteristics which, in past research, have proved to be influential as far 
as trusting behaviour is concerned.
8
  
As for the second stage, as in previous analyses of behavioural trust, we adopted the 
experimental setting of the trust game (see footnote 6) (Berg et al. 1995).  
As it has already been reported, the Trust game (often defined as an Investment game) 
portrays a bargaining context in which two different types of players – S and R   decide 
how to share a well defined amount of money
9
.  In our experiments, we adopted a 
standard Trust game (TG, hereafter) design, in as much as subjects were randomly 
                                                 
8
 The questions reported in Table 1 were taken from the standard EVS questionnaire. Unlike Glaeser et al. 
2000, we did not introduce any original question, but confined our interest to the basic ones.  
9
 The Sender initial endowment was equal to 10 experimental tokens. The experimental exchange rate was 
set to 0.1 Euro cent for each token. Payoffs varied between 6 and 10 Euro per subjects. Details of the 
payoff structure were illustrated in he Instruction sheet.  
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divided into two groups (S and R) at the beginning of the second stage, and then the game 
was played according to the rules described above.
10
 
Finally, in the third part of the sessions, subjects were divided into groups (8-12 
individuals in each group, according to the total number of participants, equally divided 
between Senders and Recipients) and they repeated the trust game, keeping the roles 
(Senders or Recipients) assigned by the computer at the beginning of stage 2.
11
 
However, before making their choice, Senders received information on the level of 
trustworthiness of the Respondents of their group. Such information differed between 
Session 1-4 and Session 5-7. 
In Session 1-4, we assessed the Recipients’ trustworthiness by asking them to declare – 
on a separate sheet of paper and before the actual game started - how many tokens they 
would return, for each possible amount of tokens sent by their anonymous partner. Such 
preference elicitation technique is known as the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
12
  
Figure 1 reports a description of the Table  Recipients were asked to fill, during stage 2. 
 
Figure 1: The Strategy Method (RBM1) 
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 There are two main differences between our  work and those of Glaeser et al, 2000 and Lazzarini et al, 
2005. Firstly we set the multiplying factor – α – equal to 3, rather than 2 as in the original paper. The 
reason why we changed the value of   α was that, higher values of the coefficient place a higher weight on 
trustworthiness, so that its influence can be monitored in the strategic interaction. Secondly,  Senders and 
Recipients were selected randomly and anonymously by the computer and no personal communication was 
allowed during the sessions. In Glaeser et al., 2000, friends were allowed to participate in the same  trust 
game. The effect of friendship or , more generally, of  a previous social relationship on trusting behaviour 
was however unclear. The reason why we adopted the anonymous partnership protocol is that we wanted to 
focus the attention on “social trustworthiness” and to avoid any previous information effect. 
11
  In the Instructions – which are available on request – the details of the experiments were explained and 
further information on the payoff and the rules were given at the beginning of each session.  
12
 See Barr et al.2004, for extensive references. The strategy method tend to assess the strategic response of 
the player in each of the possible state of the world which can be accounted in the specific context of the 
game.   
 9 
 
On the Senders’ screens, a table would consequently appear (see figure 2). The table 
contained a summary of the main statistics related to the declared behaviour of the 
Recipients allocated to their group. Specifically, the table reported for the intervals 1-10, 
11-20 and 21-30 tokens received by R, the minimum and the maximum number of tokens 
that would be returned according to their ex ante declaration. Once the Senders were 
given the opportunity to look at the table, they were asked to repeat their investment 
decision as in stage 2, matched to an anonymous R selected in the group.  
Figure 2: Information provided to Senders at Stage 3, based on the strategy 
method (RBM1) 
 
 
Several experimental methodologies have been used to measure individualistic, 
reciprocating or cooperative and altruistic behaviours. We recall here the use of 
questionnaires, pre-play one shot or repeated games and finally some variations of the 
strategy method (see Burlando and Guala, 2005, for extensive references).  Each of these 
methodologies has been criticised on several grounds. In the case of the strategy method, 
possible disadvantages are related to the weakening of incentives , since each state of the 
world occurs with less than unitary probability and problems of cognition and 
understanding may arise, as the number of observations on the players’ (in our case, the 
Respondents) behaviour increases (in our case, Respondents were asked to indicate 10 
values of the number of tokens they would return to the Sender).  Finally, according to 
some authors (Guth et al. 2001), the strategy method may have an impact on individuals’ 
 10 
social preferences, thus weakening the validity of its application as a mean to classify 
reciprocating behaviours. In our opinion, however, similar remarks may be made about 
the methodologies of the one-shot and the repeated pre-play games, whilst, in the case of 
the questionnaires, the reliability of the answers may be questioned.  
Furthermore, the strategy method has the important advantage of providing each player 
with a wide representation of the other player’s choices, motivations and social 
tendencies.  
In Session 5-7, a different procedure was followed in order to assess the individuals’ 
level of trustworthiness of Recipients. As before,  Senders were divided into groups of 
equal size. The first and second stages of the game were as before. At the third stage, 
however, rather than receive information on the distribution of tokens returned by 
Recipients, Senders received information on the trust/trustworthiness of their counterparts 
in the same group. Specifically, an index of trustworthiness was constructed from 
responses to the questions 7t, 1tw, 4tw and 8tw, with the first of these being given greater 
weight
13
. The index took theoretical values in the range 5-50 and values for individuals 
were attributed a value from 1 to 5 (from completely untrustworthy to completely 
trustworthy according to their responses)
14
. Senders were given complete information on 
the distribution of values attributed to the Recipients in their group (from which, their 
actual correspondent would be drawn at random). An example is given in Figure 3 below. 
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 Formally the index was defined as: Score = 2*7t + (11-1tw) + (11-4tw) + (11-8tw). 
14
 Again, specifically these were divided as follows: (Score ≤ 10) 1: Completely untrustworthy; (10 < Score ≤ 20) 2: 
untrustworthy; (20 < Score ≤ 30) 3: more or less trustworthy; (30 < Score ≤ 40) 4: rather trustworthy; and, (40 < Score 
≤ 50) 5: completely trustworthy. 
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Figure 3: Information on Trust and Trustworthiness (RBM2) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Attitudinal measures of Trust and Trustworthiness in the Italian sample 
We first look at the questionnaires’ answers as they result from our experiments. Table 
2 focuses on the relation between the individuals’ social characteristics (sex, age, parental 
social status and education) and the self reported measures of trust and trustworthiness. In 
this regard, indices were calculated from the questionnaire corresponding to different 
aspects of these concepts. Specifically, indices were calculated for trust in the family 
(from 2t), trustworthiness (from 1tw-8tw), trust in institutions (from 1ti-4ti) and trust in 
others (from  3t-5t & 7t). For each of the trust indices, the values of the index are 
increasing in trust (e.g. a value of 40 for “trust in others” is indicative of a person with a 
 12 
high degree of faith in others), whereas the index of trustworthiness might better be seen 
as an index of untrustworthiness in as much as the index increases as the  ‘trustworthiness 
of the respondent falls, so that, for example, a respondent indicating that ‘untrustworthy’ 
behaviour is always justified would end up with an index value of 50! Table 2 reports the 
values of these indices across different characteristics of the  experimental participants 
including also the summary index variable of trust, Score, which was used to provide 
information on the trustworthiness of counterparts in the RBM2 sessions. 
    
 
 
 
Table 2: Indices of trust and trustworthiness by individual characteristics 
Trust in the Family Trustworthiness Trust in Institutions Trust in others Score
(1-4) (5-50) (5-50) (5-50) (5-50)
Sex Male 3.9 16.4 24.7 27.2 30.9
Female 3.8 14.4 26.4 27.1 31.9
Degree Course Economics 3.9 15.5 25.0 25.9 31.0
Communication Sciences 3.9 16.8 25.9 27.6 31.4
Political Science 3.7 14.8 26.5 27.3 30.8
Specialisation 4.0 15.5 26.1 30.0 32.9
Masters 3.9 14.7 24.3 30.4 32.7
Doctorate 3.7 14.0 27.8 31.0 32.6
Family Income High Income 4.0 17.5 26.6 18.2 19.5
Mid-High Income 3.9 15.9 26.3 28.1 30.7
Mid-Low income 3.8 15.5 24.8 26.8 31.5
Low income 3.8 14.1 25.4 26.8 33.5
 
 
 
The table illustrates in general that trust and trustworthiness are often inversely related 
at least as regards their relation to other characteristics
15
.  The correspondence between 
individual characteristics and indices of trust is, however, fairly weak. Females tend to be 
both less trusting (apart from trust in institutions) and more trustworthy than males. 
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 Although, overall the index of (un)trustworthiness is negatively albeit weakly correlated with the indices of trust.  
 13 
Income appears to be negatively related to trustworthiness and positively to trust in 
institutions and the family, with the relation to trust in others being less clear
16
. 
 
3.2: Trust, Trustworthiness  and Senders’ Behaviour 
 
 
In order to examine the impact of individual characteristics, trust and trustworthiness on  
behaviour in the trust game, ordered probit models were employed to estimate: 
i) the number of tokens sent by ‘Senders’ at the second stage of the game; and,  
ii) the variation in the number of tokens sent by ‘Senders’ between the second and 
third stages of the game. 
The first of these is intended to examine in particular, the relation between the 
degree of trust of senders and their behaviour in the absence of information on the 
nature and/or behaviour of their correspondents.  
Some of the individuals’ characterics and self-reported measures of trust and 
trustworthines are included in the model. Various specifications were tried. Table 3 
reports the results of our preferred specification including just age, sex and trust 
indices. 
 It is interesting to notice that our results are very similar to that of Glaeser et al., 
2000, and Lazzarini et al., 2005, in as much as , the model is not powerful in explaining 
behaviour. There is low correlation between the answer to the basic “trust” question 
and the effective behaviour in the second stage. As in the previous study, however, it 
can be observed that ‘trust in others’ is positively related to the number of tokens sent 
and this is clearly statistically significant. Thus, the results in Table 3 clearly indicate 
that there are similarities between the results of  the Italian and the US and Brazilian 
samples.   
                                                 
16
 Although if one excludes the high income group which only contains two persons, one also has a positive relation 
between income and trust. 
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Table 3: Ordered probit model of the number of tokens sent during the first round 
of the trust game. 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err .      z
Female -0.522 0.228 -2.28
Age 0.039 0.050 0.78
Trust in the Family -0.163 0.252 -0.65
Trustworthiness 0.015 0.016 0.92
Trust in Institutions -0.005 0.018 -0.29
Trust in others 0.043 0.017 2.62
/cut1 | -0.620 1.602
/cut2 | 0.013 1.581
/cut3 | 0.974 1.566
/cut4 | 1.447 1.566
/cut5 | 1.803 1.573
/cut6 | 1.990 1.580
/cut7 | 2.158 1.586
/cut8 | 2.458 1.596
/cut9 | 2.583 1.600
/cut10 | 2.652 1.603
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo-R
2
N
-185.72
0.04
92  
Note: Coefficients which are statistically significant at at least p < 0.05 are reported in bold 
 
 
Table 4 and 5 report the results of estimating models which try to isolate the strategic component in 
the measurement of social capital. In the Tables, in fact, the estimated effect of  information is 
reported. As explained above, in the first experimental  design, Senders were given some 
information on the numbers of tokens which would be sent back in response to the number of 
tokens sent. In order to include the essence of the information in the estimation of Senders’ 
behaviour, the average ‘rate of return’
17
 observed by senders was included in an ordered probit 
                                                 
17
 That is (no. of tokens to be sent back)/(no. of tokens recieved) averaged over the possibilities (3-30). 
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model of the variation in the number of tokens sent between first and second rounds of the trust 
game. The results are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Model of the variation in the tokens sent at the second round, RBM1 
 
Coef. Std. Err z
tokens sent during round 1 -0.238 0.075 -3.16
Female 0.653 0.387 1.69
Age -0.005 0.068 -0.08
Trust in the Family -0.044 0.027 -1.64
Trustworthiness 0.040 0.028 1.42
Trust in Institutions -0.036 0.025 -1.45
Trust in others -0.310 0.307 -1.01
Observed rate of return 0.114 0.047 2.44
/cut1 | -2.722 2.177
/cut2 | -1.915 2.150
/cut3 | -0.096 2.127
/cut4 | 0.041 2.128
/cut5 | 0.339 2.126
/cut6 | 0.681 2.124
/cut7 | 0.980 2.125
/cut8 | 1.332 2.127
/cut9 | 2.096 2.156
/cut10 | 2.593 2.194
Log-Likelihood
Pseudo-R
2
N
-77.96
0.13
47  
Note: Coefficients which are statistically significant at at least p < 0.05 are reported in bold, coefficients 
with statistical significance of 0.10 > p > 0.05 are reported in italics. 
 
 
Here, there are two interesting observations to be made. First, the model is better identified this 
time, despite the fewer observations. Second, information on the observed (or in this context, 
expected) rate of return is positive and strongly statistically significant. 
In other words, if we compare the results in Table 3 and 4, we can say that information on co-
players behavioural trustworthiness is influential in determining Senders behaviour. 
 16 
All correlation between “trust in others” and the  amount sent in the second and third stage is 
in fact sweeped off by the weight individuals posit on the information on the strategic behaviour of 
Recipients. Thus, the measurement of the ex post trust differs from ex ante trust, mainly based on 
the unconditional individuals’ values. 
Turning now to the alternative experimental design in which Senders received information  
concerning the general trustworthiness of correspondents, a similar exercise was undertaken. As 
before a summary indicator of  the information provided to Senders was constructed. In this case, 
the mean  value of ‘Score’ for the group of Recipients on which Senders’ had information was 
included in the model. Table 5 reports the results. 
 
Table 5: Ordered Probit Model of the variation in the tokens sent at the second round, RBM2 
 
        
  Coef. 
Std. 
Err z 
        
tokens sent during round 1 -0.077 0.064 -1.21 
Female -0.036 0.390 -0.09 
Age 0.084 0.099 0.85 
Trust in the Family -0.008 0.023 -0.36 
Trustworthiness 0.031 0.026 1.19 
Trust in Institutions -0.004 0.027 -0.16 
Trust in others -0.402 0.574 -0.7 
Mean observed Score value 0.112 0.064 1.74 
        
/cut1 | 1.907 3.784   
/cut2 | 2.196 3.765   
/cut3 | 3.130 3.759   
/cut4 | 3.661 3.764   
/cut5 | 4.839 3.768   
/cut6 | 5.421 3.791   
/cut7 | 6.318 3.861   
        
Log-Likelihood -71.56 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.05 
N 45 
 Note: Coefficients which are statistically significant at at least p < 0.05 are reported in bold, coefficients 
with statistical significance of 0.10 > p > 0.05 are reported in italics. 
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It is observable, that the model has less explanatory power than the Strategy method estimation 
reported in Table 4. Moreover, the impact of information, although almost exactly the same as 
before, in terms of the value of the estimated coefficient, is in this case much less statistically 
significant, just breaking the 10% threshold. It might be added that, although not reported here, the 
key results – statistical significance of the information variable in the strategy method and weak or 
no statistical significance of the behavioural trust indicator – along with the parameter values 
themselves, are consistent across a range of specifications.  
 The implication is then that it is actions rather than words that do the talking. People are 
more willing to trust when they see that such trust is likely to be reciprocated in fact rather than 
being  prepared to put their fate in the hands of those they believe to act more ‘fairly’. Therefore, 
self-reported measures of social capital are not only biased indicators of trusting behaviour, but they 
are also  inefficient signals of trusting behaviour. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The research  hypothesis which has been put forward in the present study is that there is a 
strategic component in the definition of social capital that the present (attitudinal and behavioural) 
measurement methodologies do not take into account thus producing  highly biased evalutions of 
the non economic sources of economic development.  
We have assessed the magnitude of such bias by conducting experiments in Italian 
Universities, along the research lines of Glaeser et al., 2000. In line with preivous research we find 
a weak effect of ex ante measures of trust in determining behaviour. Going further we find that 
players adapt their behaviour much more to informaiton on the ex post trustworthiness of co-
respondents than to information on their ex ante trustworthiness.  
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